Mali’s escalating security challenges: jihadist and rebel offensive shakes junta and russian security model

The coordinated assaults by JNIM and FLA on April 25, 2026, signify a profound strategic shift in Mali since 2012. By striking simultaneously in Bamako, Kati, Kidal, Gao, and Sévaré, these two groups starkly revealed the limitations of a security approach heavily reliant on external partners. The recapture of Kidal severely undermines the junta’s claims to legitimacy and exposes the inherent weaknesses of the Russian partnership in confronting jihadist forces. While a direct military takeover of Bamako appears unlikely in the short term, JNIM continues to wage a persistent war of attrition. The looming threat of regional destabilization places increasing pressure across the broader Sahel region and on the coastal nations of the Gulf of Guinea.

The tightening grip on Bamako

The synchronized offensive by JNIM and FLA on April 25, 2026, represents a significant escalation in Mali’s security crisis. The simultaneous and unexpected attacks targeting Bamako, Kati, Kidal, Gao, and Sévaré reflect a continuous deterioration observed since 2020, further exacerbated by the junta’s ascent to power in August of that year.

Initially active in Mali’s northern rural areas, JNIM has steadily enhanced its capability to strike further afield, with increased intensity and coordination. In recent years, it has broadened its operations westward and southward, reaching regions previously relatively untouched. Its influence now extends beyond Malian borders, impacting coastal nations such as Togo, Bénin, and Nigeria. Concurrently, the number of attacks attributed to the group has surged, particularly those targeting the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA). In July 2024, FAMA, supported by the Russian group Africa Corps, suffered a significant setback against a coalition of JNIM and CSD-DPA. Since then, JNIM has launched a series of assaults on military bases located in Tombouctou in the north, Bamako in the south, and as far west as Kayes. For their part, FAMA has also strengthened its capabilities, notably through Bayraktar drones supplied by Turkey, although these are far from providing comprehensive territorial surveillance.

Since September 2025, JNIM has implemented a strategy to economically strangle Bamako, a capital city of approximately 3.2 million inhabitants. This involves disrupting logistical routes and targeting fuel convoys. The ultimate goal is to gradually erode the government’s legitimacy. By directly impacting the population’s living conditions, particularly through rising fuel prices and associated economic disruptions, JNIM aims to weaken the junta’s credibility while positioning itself as an alternative. The more the junta is weakened in rural areas and Bamako, the more JNIM appears as a credible alternative and a viable governance option to the populace. The blockade of the capital effectively stages the state’s impotence. JNIM seeks to improve its image not by seizing the capital by force, but by demonstrating that another form of authority can exist. In the areas it controls, the group has developed a parallel administrative structure based on Islamic justice, taxation, and trade regulation, enabling it to present itself as a concrete alternative to an absent state.

A military capture of the capital remains improbable for now, given the group’s estimated capacity of 5,000 to 6,000 fighters, compared to a city that concentrates the majority of security forces and infrastructure. JNIM also lacks sufficient popular support, especially in urban centers. However, isolated attacks against Modibo Keita International Airport, which hosts the Africa Corps base, could become more frequent. Conversely, rural areas, characterized by limited state presence, offer fertile ground for the group’s entrenchment. Furthermore, the Bamako blockade suggests that a military takeover of the capital is not a short-term objective, with the strategy focusing on a primarily psychological war of attrition. Nevertheless, the increasing pressure on Bamako allows FAMA to concentrate its responses there, thereby easing pressure on other parts of the territory.

Kidal’s recapture and the narrative’s erosion

The April 25 attacks underscore this surge in power. In Kati, the heart of Malian military authority, Defense Minister Sadio Camara was killed. In Bamako, Modibo Keita Airport was struck. In Kidal, JNIM and FLA regained control of the city, which FAMA and Wagner had recaptured in 2023 in what was then hailed as a historic victory. This strategic reversal is unprecedented since 2013, forcing Africa Corps elements to withdraw from both Kidal and Gao. The pressing question now is whether FAMA can reclaim the city in the coming weeks.

Kidal’s recapture by JNIM echoes the dynamics of 2012 when Tuareg rebels and jihadist groups initially cooperated before ideological differences led to a split. JNIM advocates for the implementation of Sharia law, while Tuareg rebels pursue an autonomist agenda focused on Azawad. Kidal then became a symbol of this division, contested by both factions. These divergences persist today, but the identification of common adversaries—the junta and its Russian partner—has fostered an opportunistic tactical convergence. Signs of rapprochement had, in fact, been circulating since March 2025. According to jihadist movement expert Wassim Nasr, negotiations to combine efforts reportedly took place as early as December 2024. Whether this opportunistic coalition is sustainable and capable of holding Kidal remains to be seen.

These attacks occurred despite a truce that was reportedly due to be signed in late March 2026 between JNIM and the Malian government, which would have involved the release of several