Ahead of Cameroon’s pivotal 2027 double elections, economist Serge Alain Godong delivers a forthright analysis of the nation’s political dynamics.
Employing concepts from “game theory” and the “prisoner’s dilemma,” Godong elucidates why, in his view, Maurice Kamto could not secure victory in 2018 and faces significant hurdles in the upcoming electoral cycle. In a comprehensive text, he portrays a government he deems “openly twilight” and an electorate that consistently gravitates towards the known certainties rather than embracing the uncertainties of promised change.
“The overtly twilight nature of the four-decade-old regime in power more than ever compels us to consider the dynamics of consolidation or change at play within the Cameroonian public sphere,” states Serge Alain Godong, an economist with credentials from Sciences-Po Paris, EHESS, and Paris X, in his insightful analysis.
For Godong, the year 2018 serves as a crucial starting point. He recalls, “The astonishment gradually subsided regarding the ‘penalty scored’ that Mr. Maurice Kamto had publicly claimed to have taken.” Since then, Paul Biya has been sworn in, the MRC opposition party has been effectively neutralized, and the majority of Cameroonians have “acknowledged the tranquil continuation of his stay on that comfortable seat of Etoudi.”
Godong’s argument rests on the foundations of “game theory,” built upon two core assumptions: “humans are fundamentally calculators” and “they require information” to safeguard their gains. An election, he posits, transforms into “a specific juncture where a particular individual proposes a form of contract for the future to a national community.”
However, in Godong’s assessment, Kamto is unable to present a more credible contract than the one currently in place. He suggests, “The approximately 8.5 million Cameroonian voters expected to cast their ballots next year would only grant their votes to Mr. Maurice Kamto if they were absolutely convinced that he would, in the coming years, better guarantee their interests than Mr. Paul Biya.”
The economist identifies approximately 16 million current “winners” within the system: civil servants, employees in the formal private sector, liberal professionals, and their families. “It can therefore be estimated that some 1500 billion F. CFA are annually distributed among the approximately 16 million Cameroonians who fall into this category of winners.” These individuals benefit from the national wage bill, public procurement contracts, and major development projects. “It is these Cameroonians and their close associates who will undoubtedly vote for the RDPC and its candidate, with full awareness of the implications.”
This leads to the “prisoner’s dilemma”: without coordinated information and concrete evidence of a superior gain model, voters tend to favor the status quo. “Cameroonians are therefore perfectly aware that the current situation is rather disadvantageous; yet many among them seem distinctly to prefer it to a presumably superior equilibrium position, about which they can say nothing with certainty.”
The analysis then shifts to what Godong terms the “Bamiléké problem.” Citing Meredith Terretta, he recalls the distinction between “gung” and “lepue” – referring to territory and freedom, respectively. From this, he suggests, stems an “economic and social Darwinism” often attributed to individuals from the Grassfields region. Consequently, “Mr. Kamto is thus not viewed through the ordinary lens of a person offering an alternative political proposal […] but rather as a kind of malevolent avatar come to execute a diabolical plan.”
Godong describes a “syndrome” distinct from Stockholm syndrome, characterizing a system of “eating together”: “everyone is linked to everyone else by a small scheme; everyone takes from their neighbor.” This model defines winners as simply “those who ‘eat’ and losers as those who are hungry.”
Godong’s conclusion is unequivocal: whoever emerges victorious “will have no choice but to act swiftly and decisively.” Swiftly to redistribute resources, and decisively to elevate the economy as the sole “battle horse.” Achieving 6% growth, reducing the deficit, and combating corruption are all objectives he deems “serious and urgent.”
Ultimately, the analyst predicts that the political game “will become less and less sluggish, less and less rent-seeking.” He also suggests that the nation requires “a strong and committed Paul Biya” to navigate the post-election era.
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