France-Morocco friendship treaty: a new strategic partnership

France and Morocco are working on a friendship treaty designed to rest on durable strategic interests. The goal is to create, with necessary adjustments, an equivalent of the 1963 Élysée Treaty between France and Germany signed by Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer.

The joint commission tasked with this effort is not negotiating the treaty itself — that remains the prerogative of the two governments. Rather, it is charged with formulating proposals covering the partnership’s guiding principles, strategic priorities for the 2035–2040 horizon, political dialogue mechanisms, and areas of cooperation in economy, security, military, academia, and culture.

One fundamental question arises: why a friendship treaty? It would replace the La Celle-Saint-Cloud agreement signed in France on November 6, 1955, which laid the groundwork for Morocco’s return to independence and the end of the protectorate, formally recognized on March 2, 1956. That same accord allowed Paris to authorize Mohammed V’s return to the throne after his deportation on August 20, 1953.

Today, the aim is to consolidate a privileged, even exceptional cooperative relationship while laying strategic foundations for an equal partnership that will endure for decades.

Four main pillars stand out. The first is economic: France commits to major investments in Morocco’s automotive, railway, defense, and maritime transport sectors, and to support modernization with cutting-edge technologies. In return, Rabat pledges preferential access for French companies to large infrastructure projects and offers tax incentives.

The second pillar involves security and defense industry cooperation. This includes military technology transfers that could eventually make Morocco a regional production center for light and heavy equipment — aircraft, ammunition, military vehicles, armored systems — as well as expanded joint training programs and strengthened intelligence coordination to address regional security challenges, particularly in the Sahel.

Culture forms the third pillar, and an important one. It entails preserving the privileged position of the French language in the education system, promoting francophonie without hindering the kingdom’s openness to English as a global business language, easing access for Moroccan students — currently over 42,000 — to French universities, expanding the existing network of twelve French cultural institutes, and opening new schools, especially in the southern provinces.

The final pillar is geopolitical and strategic. Paris backs Morocco’s core interests: support for the autonomy plan for the Sahara, validated by the United Nations Security Council within the framework of a negotiated settlement (Resolution 2797 of October 31, 2025), advocacy within European Union institutions, and defense of Moroccan interests in sectors like agriculture and fisheries in bilateral and multilateral cooperation frameworks.

France also hopes to count on Morocco to participate, in various ways, in new strategic alliances across West Africa, a region where French influence has waned over the past decade. The objective is to leverage the kingdom’s position as a regional hub.

This treaty carries major symbolic and diplomatic weight. It would bind France to a non-European Union state, whereas Algeria has failed to conclude a similar agreement for over twenty years, despite multiple attempts under the presidencies of Jacques Chirac, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Emmanuel Macron, and Abdelmadjid Tebboune.

Morocco now asserts itself as a regional power, an economic hub, and a key player in energy, logistics, and security matters. This treaty could take on a demonstrative and exemplary dimension, serving as a model to reshape new forms of cooperation between Europe and Africa.