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Mali crisis: rebel advance sparks fears of political talks
The Malian junta led by Assimi Goïta, backed by Russian forces, faces unprecedented pressure following a major offensive on April 25 by jihadists from the JNIM—Al-Qaïda’s Sahel branch—and separatists from the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA). Northern Mali now risks falling into rebel hands, as it did in 2012 when a similar coalition seized control. Yet the current context differs sharply from the past. Western intervention, like France’s Barkhane operation then, seems unlikely today. What are the rebels’ goals? How will Russia respond? And how should European nations prepare for the emergence of a new jihadist proto-state in Mali? Jonathan Guiffard examines the risks for civilians and the deepening fragmentation of the Sahel.
On April 25, 2026, a coordinated military push was launched in Mali by the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)—Al-Qaïda’s Sahel affiliate—and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) against Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and their Russian partners in the so-called Afrika Korps. The assault has sent shockwaves through Bamako’s government, reviving memories of the 2012 takeover of northern Mali by a comparable coalition—albeit under vastly different political circumstances.
How does today’s crisis compare to 2012? And what short-term outcomes might this offensive bring?
The current landscape: the boldest offensive in years
On April 25, 2026, a sweeping offensive targeted five key Malian cities: Bamako, Kidal, Gao, Sévaré, and Mopti. This marks the first time since March 2012 that the jihadist group and the rebel coalition have launched a joint operation of such scale—their earlier sporadic coordination since 2024 has evolved into a concrete partnership. In each city, attacks focused on FAMa and Russian positions. In Bamako, symbolic sites came under fire, including the Kati military district and the international airport.
A partial assessment can already be made, though the situation remains fluid:
- Northern towns have fallen under rebel and jihadist control. Kidal was captured, along with neighboring towns like Tessalit and Anéfis. Other areas—Ber, Bourem, Gourma-Rharous, Léré, Intahaka, and Tessit—have also been seized, gradually encircling Tombouctou and Gao. However, key military bases held by Malian and Russian forces remain under siege, including those in Gao, Tombouctou, and Aguelhok.
- Junta leaders have come under direct attack. Defense Minister General Sadio Camara was killed, and several officials were wounded, including General Modibo Koné, head of Mali’s National Security Agency. Meanwhile, President Assimi Goïta, the junta’s leader, was reportedly evacuated to Turkey’s embassy before resurfacing publicly on April 28 alongside Russian officials.
- Rumors of a power struggle within the junta involving General Malick Diaw circulated but remain unconfirmed. One thing is clear: the military leadership has been severely shaken by the assault.
While the offensive echoes 2012, key differences stand out:
- The JNIM and FLA are coordinating openly, with the JNIM even allowing FLA leaders to take the spotlight. Unlike Elghabass Ag Intallah and Bilal Ag Cherif of the FLA, JNIM leaders like Iyad ag Ghali and Hamadoun Kouffa have remained out of public view, with only high-ranking figure Sidan Ag Hitta spotted in Tessalit.
- Instead of executing captured soldiers as in 2012, both groups are prioritizing negotiations and disarmament, allowing FAMa troops to withdraw peacefully before urging others to lay down arms. They position themselves as defenders of both civilians and soldiers against Bamako’s junta.
- Talks with Russian mercenaries secured their withdrawal from bases in Kidal and other northern cities without resistance, mirroring tactics used in Syria. Algeria likely facilitated these negotiations, possibly in coordination with the FLA.
- The northern advance was enabled by a strategy to pin FAMa forces in central Mali and Bamako simultaneously. The prolonged attack on Bamako itself is unprecedented.
Talks with Russian mercenaries secured their withdrawal from bases in Kidal and other northern cities without resistance, mirroring tactics used in Syria.
This offensive reveals that the two armed groups have softened their approaches while learning from past failures and successes since 2012. Rather than seizing visible control of cities, they appear to be advancing a strategy of strangulation—one they’ve employed since 2020. By April 28, the JNIM had imposed a full blockade on Bamako, burning supply trucks to demonstrate resolve while the junta organizes limited convoys to keep the capital supplied.
Unlike 2012–2013, the regime, FAMa, and their Russian allies have not collapsed entirely and have attempted to regain momentum through sweeping counteroperations. While Bamako’s situation is dire, it is not yet terminal. In response, civil society voices have renewed calls for negotiations with armed groups, criticizing the junta’s military-only approach. Prominent figures like politician Oumar Mariko, former minister Mamadou Ismaïla Konaté, imam Mahmoud Dicko, and the Brussels-based Alliance of Sahel Democrats (ADS) have echoed these demands.
Amid this shifting landscape, the Islamic State’s Sahel Province (EIWS) launched an attack on Ménaka but was repelled by Russian-Malian forces. Though not part of the JNIM/FLA offensive, EIWS remains a persistent and serious threat in northeastern Mali.
An anticipated crisis
As early as September 15, 2022, we warned that Russian military assistance was an illusion—ill-equipped to address Mali’s security challenges and counterproductive, alienating civilians while failing to curb JNIM’s expansion.
- In January 2023, a foresight exercise anticipated the unfolding scenario, including:
“Rising tensions between the CMA and FAMa/Wagner will reignite armed clashes in the north, with the CMA objectively allied to the JNIM, which will support its efforts to regain full control over the northern Niger loop, or even half of the country“ - “Central Mali’s de facto fragmentation will fuel regular clashes between the Macina Katibat and community self-defense militias. These militias are unlikely to prevail, and central Mali will gradually fall under JNIM’s control“
- “Bamako’s capital region will be encircled […] Unless the Malian army collapses entirely, the city is unlikely to fall as it did in 2012“
- “Mali’s territorial loss will spark political tensions and ultimately force a political dialogue with the JNIM to establish a lasting truce. This could result in ceding vast swaths of territory or imposing significant constitutional changes. Pressure from Mali’s religious institutions will push the government toward negotiations.”
By November 2023, after FAMa and Russian forces retook Kidal, we noted that this ‘victory’ was illusory—the CMA had strategically retreated to prepare a future counteroffensive rather than suffer heavy losses. Their brief control over the region ended with the July 2024 battle of Tinzawatene, culminating in the recent conquests.
These insights confirm that the current crisis was foreseeable. With this in mind, we can explore the likely short-term developments.
Short-term outlook
Militarily, the JNIM-FLA coalition will likely negotiate the withdrawal of Russian forces from the north before seizing Gao and Tombouctou, effectively partitioning Mali as occurred in March 2012. At the time, the sequence began with Kidal’s capture, followed by two separate advances on Gao and Tombouctou, with mass desertions of Malian troops hastening the fall. Today, under dual military and diplomatic pressure, FAMa may continue to desert due to fractured command chains and political turmoil in Bamako. If Russian forces withdraw from northern strongholds, the capture of Gao, Tombouctou, and the entire Niger loop appears inevitable.
The only factor that could slow a rapid conquest or strong territorial occupation by the rebel-jihadist coalition is the threat posed by Malian and Burkinabé TB2 drones. While JNIM and FLA may destroy Mali’s drones or target airfields with kamikaze drones, striking Burkinabé or Nigerien drones remains far more challenging.
The north of Mali is poised to fall gradually under full FLA and JNIM control, especially as both groups have adjusted their objectives: the FLA seeks de facto autonomy without political separation, while the JNIM appears content with a more flexible application of Islamic law. This reduces the likelihood of a repeat of March 2012, when jihadists seized cities by force, clashed with Arab-Tuareg allies, and imposed brutal governance. Recall that after AQMI’s defeat by French forces in 2013, AQMI leaders advocated a softer expansion strategy, focusing on preaching and limited Islamic law.
Controlling northern Mali will position the armed groups advantageously, but with two additional fronts that may strain their resources: against the Islamic State in the Ménaka region and against airstrikes by Malian and Burkinabé forces.
Unlike 2012, JNIM fighters are also active in central Mali, and this northern offensive may be accompanied by fresh attacks on Malian garrisons in Gossi, Boni, Hombori, Niafunké, Konna, Mopti, and Sévaré. Without FLA support in this region, operations will likely aim to disrupt FAMa deployments rather than seize cities. Recent reprisals by jihadists against civilians in Kori-Kori and Gomossogou reflect this strategy: violent tactics against ‘non-submissive’ villages risk clashing with their broader political image as protectors against junta brutality. The jihadist command’s difficulty in controlling its factions remains a critical weakness.
The fate of central and southern Mali is harder to predict for two reasons: first, JNIM has controlled rural areas for years, besieging cities and negotiating local agreements with communities in exchange for limited Islamic law—akin to the Vietcong in Vietnam or the Taliban in Afghanistan. Second, unlike the Taliban, JNIM lacks the troop numbers to sustain broad territorial control.
The 2012–2013 capture of Kidal, Gao, and Tombouctou allowed jihadist groups to recruit heavily, particularly in central communities. A similar strategy could significantly bolster JNIM’s ranks.
The siege of Bamako is a strategy to suffocate and weaken the junta, either forcing regime change or coercing negotiations.
The siege of Bamako is a strategy to suffocate and weaken the junta, either forcing regime change or coercing negotiations. Despite propaganda to the contrary, the scale of this offensive—just months after the capital’s first successful siege—exposes the junta’s inability to manage the crisis. Assimi Goïta is trapped in Bamako, much like Bashar al-Assad in Damascus. Growing mistrust between junta leaders, particularly Goïta’s increasing skepticism toward the Russian partnership, threatens to destabilize the regime: figures like Sadio Camara and Modibo Koné, key architects of the Russian alliance, have been sidelined, making it easier to reconsider this partnership. The Russian alliance may collapse, accelerating the fall of northern and central Mali. Ongoing negotiations, combined with months of tensions between FAMa and Russian mercenaries—who have criticized the national army since the Tinzawatene defeat—add to the pressure.
Unless forced into talks, the junta has little incentive to abandon its Russian partnership if it hopes to survive, which may help secure Bamako. If the junta continues paying, it can maintain Russian protection in the region, though regaining territory seems improbable. If Russia withdraws support, Mali will rely on limited aid from Burkina Faso and Niger, both embroiled in their own jihadist conflicts. Senegal may mobilize at its borders but is unlikely to deploy troops, given JNIM’s growing presence there. Algeria, Mauritania, Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire will likely remain observers, privately welcoming the junta’s humiliation while pushing for negotiations.
Prospectively:
- Long-term trends since 2022 indicate northern Mali’s fall is inevitable, as is the loss of central regions. The timeline is uncertain, but the balance of power is clear.
- Medium-term trends show the Russian partnership is fragile and doomed to fail, as is Bamako’s military strategy—a reality underscored by recent events.
- Two potential turning points could emerge:
o A negotiated settlement, driven by the junta’s collapse or external diplomatic pressure.
o A foreign military intervention to reverse the balance of power and alter long- and medium-term trends.
What options remain for Mali and the international community?
In this context, several non-exclusive scenarios are likely unfolding.
Scenario 1: The prospect of foreign military intervention
What happens when JNIM raises its black flag over a major Malian city?
This crisis raises a critical question: what happens when JNIM raises its black flag over a major Malian city? Before 2022, such a move would have triggered Western military intervention (Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Mali) to dismantle the jihadist group. However, withdrawals from Afghanistan and the Sahel have made this option far less viable, given the proven limitations of such operations. Is regional or international military intervention desirable, feasible, or realistic? Regionally, only Algeria’s army could reverse the balance of power—but it is unlikely to intervene outside its borders under its historical non-intervention doctrine. Mauritania has maintained a non-aggression pact with AQMI and JNIM since 2010. Other regional forces have already faced jihadists and demonstrated their limitations, meaning they will likely maintain defensive positions. In this context, only an international intervention could shift the tide, temporarily as Barkhane once did. France is unlikely to return to the Sahel, and the UN is not an option. Europe will not act alone, and the U.S. is focused elsewhere—the Sahel is not a priority. These factors make negotiations the most plausible path forward.
Scenario 2: The likelihood of a broad political negotiation
Since 2025, JNIM leaders have sought a victory akin to Syria’s HTC, implying a gradual acceptance of nationalizing their struggle, implementing ‘moderate’ Islamic governance, and engaging in dialogue with the international community. To do so, JNIM has sought a sponsor since 2024, much like Turkey was for HTC. Algeria or Mauritania could fill this role. JNIM also looks for an Islamic governance model inspired by these countries. Both nations maintain close ties with FLA leaders, engage with JNIM cadres, and oppose Bamako’s junta—but neither has confirmed willingness to play this role.
This strategy anticipates a conquest through the junta’s collapse, followed by negotiations with a political force willing to accept their demands: implementation of Islamic law nationwide; greater autonomy for northern and central regions; and integration of JNIM and FLA into local governance.
A major hurdle remains: unlike HTC, JNIM has not severed its allegiance to Al-Qaïda, nor abandoned its intent to export its ideology beyond Mali’s borders. Additionally, JNIM does not officially engage with the international community, complicating efforts toward normalization. It is unclear whether JNIM could be an acceptable negotiating partner for regional powers or European nations. The political framework remains unfavorable.
A comprehensive political negotiation would require talks with both the FLA—building on the Algiers Accords—and the JNIM, aligning with local agreements negotiated with the High Islamic Council of Mali.
Pressure from Russian, Turkish, or African partners (such as Togo and Ghana) against the junta may be necessary to break the deadlock. Without negotiations, the strangulation strategy will persist, and captured cities will serve as staging grounds for further attacks on FAMa.
Long-term, France and Europe must recognize that the strategic landscape has shifted. Despite relative normalization, the emergence of a jihadist proto-state will demand heightened vigilance, much like in Syria and Afghanistan, to monitor potential terrorist threats. Arab and African partners will need to be mobilized and supported to contain and normalize these new international actors.
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