When Niger’s military leaders severed ties with Orano, the French company that had mined the country’s uranium for over fifty years, they promised a new era of sovereignty and better returns. More than two years after the July 2023 coup, the fallout from that decision is reshaping the national conversation—and raising hard questions about what actually comes next. The break with Orano is not just a diplomatic rupture; it is an industrial and financial shock whose consequences are still unfolding, with no clear proof yet that Niamey is selling its uranium on better terms than before.
A sovereignty win, but an industry left exposed
The divorce from Orano was never merely symbolic. It struck at the heart of Niger’s mining economy.
Orano lost operational control of its Nigerien operations in December 2024, and on June 19, 2025, the Somaïr mining company—the historic operator of the Arlit mine—was nationalized. The French group, which held 63.4% of Somaïr against the Nigerien state’s 36.6%, disputes the move and has launched international arbitration proceedings.
The challenge for Niamey is that taking over a mine does not automatically mean having a market for its output.
Niger’s production has fallen sharply over the past decade, dropping from 4,116 tonnes in 2015 to just 962 tonnes in 2024, according to figures cited in 2026. Only one mine remains in operation, while several projects are still awaiting development.
In short, mining sovereignty has advanced faster than the country’s industrial and commercial capacity.
The price question: why the comparison with Orano is misleading
A widely repeated claim holds that Niger was paid a “French price” far below today’s global market. That comparison is deceptive.
Uranium does not trade like oil. There is no single stock exchange setting a daily price at which all producers sell. Contracts are negotiated directly between producers, intermediaries, and nuclear utilities, with formulas that can blend spot and long-term indices.
Still, historical data offer a useful benchmark.
In 2020, available figures indicated that Niger received around 48.1 billion CFA francs for 1,113 tonnes from Cominak and 103.3 billion CFA francs for 1,879 tonnes from Somaïr. For Somaïr, that worked out to roughly 83.75 euros per kilogram of uranium, based on public data from that period.
A separate analysis drawing on Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative data estimated that uranium purchased from Orano had recently been priced around 45,000 CFA francs per kilogram, or about $33 per pound, while some European or Japanese buyers reportedly paid around 60,000 CFA francs per kilogram.
The market has changed dramatically since then.
In 2025, the average spot price paid by European utilities was $70.33 per pound, up from $53.59 in 2024. The average price of multi-year contracts, however, was much lower, at $54.70 per pound.
By late September 2026, the spot indicator stood around $89.63 per pound, while the long-term price reached about $96.50 per pound.
The takeaway is significant: Niger now operates in a far more favorable price environment than in the early 2020s. But that does not prove Niamey is actually selling its uranium at $90 or $100 per pound.
And that is where the picture becomes opaque.
The murky Russian deal and the yellowcake convoy
The most striking case concerns the stockpile of yellowcake accumulated at Arlit.
In 2025, several French sources claimed Niamey had struck an agreement with Russia covering 1,000 tonnes of uranium concentrate for about $170 million. If confirmed, that would work out to roughly $170 per kilogram, or nearly $77 per pound.
That price would be below the late-September 2026 spot price, but comparable to some contract levels seen on the international market.
The problem is that the deal has never been officially confirmed by either side. The Nigerien government denied selling the stock, and Rosatom said it was not party to the agreement in question.
Yet the affair is not simply a rumor without material evidence.
In November 2025, around 1,000 tonnes of yellowcake were in fact loaded onto trucks at Arlit. About thirty vehicles then headed to Niamey under military escort. The convoy ultimately became stranded at the capital’s airport.
This is precisely where the gray zone begins.
A physical transfer of that scale is not, by itself, proof of a sale. But it shows that Nigerien authorities were actively working to commercialize the stock.
The $170 million figure should therefore be presented as an allegation documented by multiple sources, not as an established contract.
Iran talks: confidential negotiations that left traces
The Russian case is not the first opaque episode.
In 2024, Le Monde revealed confidential negotiations between Niamey and Tehran over 300 tonnes of yellowcake, valued at an estimated $56 million. Several Western and Nigerien sources confirmed the talks took place.
The Nigerien government denied concluding a sale. But an adviser to the ruling authorities acknowledged that Iran had wanted to buy the 300 tonnes, explaining that Niamey refused for lack of available stock.
Here too, three distinct notions must be separated: negotiation, agreement, and executed contract.
The available information establishes that negotiations occurred. It does not prove that a clandestine delivery took place.
Russia and China: new allies or new customers?
Russia is now Niamey’s most visible geopolitical partner in the nuclear sector.
In December 2025, the Nigerien company Timersoi National Uranium Company signed a cooperation agreement with Uranium One Group, a subsidiary of Russia’s Rosatom, to explore deposits and eventually develop new mines.
China, too, has shown interest in the Arlit stockpile. In 2025, sources pointed to discussions potentially covering around 1,000 tonnes.
But these new partners do not necessarily guarantee better prices.
What they mainly offer Niger is more negotiating options.
That is a fundamental difference.
So is Niger selling its uranium better today?
At this stage, the most honest answer is: not yet demonstrated.
Niger now has three advantages it did not possess with the same intensity before.
First, the international uranium price is much higher.
Second, Niamey is seeking to diversify its partners: Russia, China, but also Canadian, Australian, and American players.
Third, the government now directly controls a key part of the mining chain.
But three weaknesses limit this strategy: falling production, logistical problems, and legal uncertainty linked to the dispute with Orano.
In September 2025, an ICSID arbitral tribunal ordered Niger not to sell or transfer to third parties the uranium produced by Somaïr that is subject to the litigation.
Political sovereignty alone is not enough to create a solvent market.
The Nigerien paradox
Niger now wants to sell its uranium “at the best price.” But to do so, it must produce regularly, transport its ore securely, attract capital, and legally guarantee its contracts.
The country is precisely trying to rebuild that capacity. In 2026, it even created the Teloua Safeguarding Uranium Mining Company, meant to replace the nationalized Somaïr. At the same time, new Western investors are returning: in September 2026, the United States approved up to $414 million in financing for Global Atomic’s Dasa project, led by a Canadian company.
That may be the real turning point.
Niger is not simply replacing France with Russia. It is gradually trying to turn its uranium into a lever of competition among several powers.
For now, however, no public evidence shows that new contracts bring Niger more than those signed under Orano. International price levels are higher, yes. Negotiating options are more numerous, yes. But the contracts actually signed, their pricing formulas, premiums, logistical costs, and the net share returning to the state remain largely opaque.
As for “secret contracts,” there are confidential negotiations and accusations serious enough to justify investigations, particularly involving Iran and Russia. But speaking of definitively established secret deals would, to date, go beyond the available evidence.
The real issue for Niamey is therefore no longer just whom to sell its uranium to. It is at what price, with what guarantees, and above all what share of that value will actually remain in Niger.