Malian tuareg and arab separatists launch new offensive for azawad independence

The separatist Front for the Liberation of Azawad (FLA) has reportedly joined forces with the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (JNIM) to launch a second military offensive this weekend. Their objective is to reclaim control of northern and central Malian territories currently held by government forces.

This renewed push follows nearly two months after the FLA formed an alliance with the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Jamaat-e-Nosra al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), initiating coordinated attacks across northern, central, and southern Mali on April 25.

These earlier assaults even reached Kati, a critical stronghold for Mali’s military leadership, severely shaking the government of Assimi Goïta. The Minister of Defense, Sadio Camara, was killed during these events, and the head of intelligence services, Modibo Koné, sustained serious injuries.

During the April offensive, the FLA had briefly recaptured Kidal, a town that had become a highly symbolic stronghold for the Malian army and the Russian Africa Corps (AFRICC) troops following its capture in 2023, representing a significant military success in the country’s north.

However, the Malian army later announced it had regained control of Kidal after a counter-offensive launched in the aftermath of the April 25 attacks.

Reports from various social media accounts and specialized Sahel security blogs indicate a new mobilization by the FLA, including the recruitment of residents from northern Mali, in preparation for their upcoming offensive.

In response, Malian authorities announced on June 4 a substantial reward totaling $12.4 million for any information leading to the arrest or death of JNIM and FLA leaders.

The Malian army and the Africa Corps have intensified their operations in the country’s northern regions, while significant investments in military equipment are underway to bolster defenses against potential future attacks.

Who are the FLA?

The Front for the Liberation of Azawad (FLA) was established on November 30, 2024, in Tinzaouatene, a small town in northern Mali bordering Algeria. It emerged from the merger of various Tuareg and Arab separatist armed groups, all sharing the common goal of Azawad’s independence.

Azawad refers to a region encompassing the areas around Gao, Timbuktu, Kidal, and Ménaka. This territory was declared an independent state in 2012 by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), one of the foundational groups of the FLA.

The FLA succeeded the Permanent Strategic Framework for Peace, Security, and Development (CSP-PDA) coalition, which itself was formed by the amalgamation of several separatist factions.

These organizations included the MNLA, the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA), rebel factions of the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA), and the pro-government Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies (Gatia).

However, Tuareg unity efforts trace back to 1988 in Libya, where the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MPLA) was founded by Algerian and Libyan exiles under the leadership of Iyad Ag Ghaly, who is now the current head of JNIM.

Bilal Ag Acherif serves as the president of the FLA. Born in Kidal in 1977, he plays a pivotal role in the FLA’s political leadership and governance.

Acherif’s right-hand man, Alghabass Ag Intalla, holds the position of FLA military chief, responsible for reconciliation and relations with JNIM. Intalla is the son of the late Ifoghas traditional chief, Intallah Ag Attaher, who passed away in 2014.

Mohamed Ramadane acts as the group’s spokesperson.

What are the FLA’s objectives?

Since Mali gained independence in 1960, certain Arab and Tuareg communities have maintained opposition to the Malian government, leading to armed rebellions in 1962, 1990-1996, and most recently in 2012.

The FLA’s primary goal is the establishment of an “Azawad Republic,” intended as a homeland for the approximately two million Tuaregs scattered across West and North Africa, a dispersion largely attributed to colonial fragmentation.

The FLA accuses the government of systemic political, economic, and cultural marginalization of these northern communities.

Despite the northern regions of Mali possessing rich reserves of salt, uranium, gold, diamonds, and phosphates, there has been minimal government investment in essential infrastructure such as schools, health centers, water and electricity supply, and roads.

Acherif recently articulated the movement’s push for independence, asserting that Azawad “was annexed to Mali without considering its history as an independent civilization.”

The Malian government has accused neighboring Algeria and Mauritania of providing support to the FLA. Algeria previously mediated the Algiers Accords, signed in 2015 between the Malian government and northern armed groups, an agreement Mali abandoned in January 2024.

Ukraine, Mauritania, and France have also faced accusations of backing the FLA’s cause.

The precise number of FLA fighters remains undisclosed. However, Ramadane stated that the group maintains a “strong military presence extending from the Mauritanian to the Algerian border,” with primary camps situated near the Algerian frontier, including in Kidal and Tinzaouatine.

Between 2024 and 2025, the FLA predominantly employed kamikaze drones in their attacks. Nonetheless, the FLA frequently disseminates images depicting fighters armed with rifles, traversing desert landscapes in long convoys of pickup trucks.

How have relations between FLA and JNIM evolved?

JNIM leader Ghaly himself was a prominent figure in the Tuareg rebellion before shifting towards radical Islamist groups in the late 1990s. However, the current relationship between JNIM and the FLA dates back to mid-2024.

In May 2024, Ag Intalla reportedly announced that the CSP-DPA had initiated discussions aimed at rapprochement with JNIM. Ramadane later clarified that the FLA and JNIM had agreed upon a “tacit non-aggression pact.”

Later, in July 2024, the CSP-DPA, with assistance from JNIM, was involved in the battle of Tinzaouatene, which resulted in the deaths of dozens of Malian soldiers and Russian Wagner Group mercenaries.

The armed group criticized the FLA for allegedly failing to acknowledge JNIM’s “sacrifices and generosity” during these engagements.

By March 2025, Malian media reported that the two groups had agreed to jointly combat the army and Russian troops following talks held in late February 2025. After the widespread attacks across Mali on April 25, both groups publicly acknowledged their partnership.

The Front for the Liberation of Azawad (FLA) framed this agreement as a “strategic convergence” aimed at overthrowing the Malian military government. Conversely, the National Islamic Front of Mali (JNIM) asserted that this partnership became viable after the Tuaregs declared their readiness for the “establishment of Sharia law.”

Acherif informed Al Arabiya Al Hadath that the FLA and JNIM operate in the same region and confront a common adversary.

“There are ideological differences, but we are discussing local solutions,” he affirmed.

The long-term viability of this partnership remains uncertain due to the inherent ideological divergences and differing objectives of the two groups.