June 22, 2026

Ouaga Press

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2024 census and electoral boundaries in Morocco: growing gap between population and representation

2024 census and electoral boundaries in Morocco: growing gap between population and representation

Rapid urban expansion confirmed by the 2024 census challenges the fairness of Morocco’s electoral map, with stark disparities in voter-to-representative ratios. As cities sprawl and historic centers shrink, will the 2026 legislative elections reflect true demographic realities?

Voters registering for the 2026 legislative elections

The 2024 General Population and Housing Census (RGPH 2024) has exposed dramatic shifts in Morocco’s demographic landscape. Over the past decade, rapid urban sprawl in peripheral areas, declining populations in historic city centers, and relative stagnation in rural regions have reshaped the country’s population distribution.

These changes raise a critical question as the nation prepares for the 2026 legislative elections: Does the current electoral map still ensure fair and equitable representation? A closer examination of demographic data alongside electoral boundaries reveals striking disparities in voter-to-representative ratios across Morocco’s constituencies.

Extreme disparities: A single vote can carry vastly different weight

Analysis of the electoral map, which calculates the number of eligible voters per deputy seat, uncovers significant imbalances. Morocco’s electoral system operates under two key principles:

  • Demographic proportionality: Assigning seats based on population size.
  • Territorial equity: Guaranteeing a minimum of two seats per province to prevent marginalization of sparsely populated or remote regions.

This dual approach creates stark contrasts in representativeness. In several southern provinces and low-density areas, the ratio of eligible voters per seat is exceptionally low:

  • Aousserd: 2,992 eligible voters per deputy seat.
  • Tarfaya: 5,368 eligible voters per deputy seat.
  • Assa-Zag: 10,178 eligible voters per deputy seat.
  • Es-Semara: 19,712 eligible voters per deputy seat.
  • Boujdour: 20,185 eligible voters per deputy seat.

At the opposite end of the spectrum, major urban hubs and their surrounding suburbs exhibit extremely high ratios:

  • Tanger-Assilah: 213,980 eligible voters per deputy seat.
  • Ménara (Marrakech): 176,256 eligible voters per deputy seat.
  • Sidi Bernoussi (Casablanca): 174,501 eligible voters per deputy seat.
  • Nouaceur (Casablanca periphery): 155,172 eligible voters per deputy seat.
  • Inezgane-Aït Melloul: 151,978 eligible voters per deputy seat.

A vote cast in a province like Aousserd or Tarfaya thus carries far greater proportional influence in electing a deputy compared to a vote in dense urban centers such as Tanger or Marrakech.

Urban-rural divide and the rise of suburbs

The RGPH 2024 data underscores Morocco’s accelerating urbanization. With a total population of 36,828,330, urban residents now number 23,110,108, an increase of nearly 2.68 million over a decade. The rural population stands at 13,718,222, having grown by just 302,419 in the same period. Notably, 71.2% of the national population is concentrated in just five regions: Grand Casablanca-Settat, Rabat-Salé-Kénitra, Marrakech-Safi, Fès-Meknès, and Tanger-Tétouan-Al Hoceïma.

Geographer David Goeury highlights a key trend: the exodus of residents from historic city centers to outlying communes. In Casablanca-Anfa, the population plummeted by nearly a quarter over ten years, dropping from 453,000 to 332,000. Yet, the area retains its historical allocation of four seats, translating to a ratio of 68,707 eligible voters per seat.

Conversely, the peripheral province of Nouaceur saw its population double to 665,000. With only three seats, its ratio stands at 155,172 eligible voters per seat—more than twice that of Casablanca-Anfa.

If the 2026 electoral boundaries remain unchanged, these disparities will deepen within metropolitan areas. Rabat illustrates a similar pattern: while its central constituencies like Rabat-Océan and Rabat-Chellah have ratios of 55,856 and 59,598 eligible voters per seat, respectively, the rapidly growing periphery of Skhirat-Témara records 141,832 eligible voters per seat.

Political stakes of potential redistricting

Adjusting the electoral map to reflect 2024 census data demands complex political decisions ahead of the 2026 elections. If the Interior Ministry opts to rebalance seats without increasing the total number of deputies, it may need to redistribute seats from declining urban centers like Casablanca-Anfa or Rabat to expanding peripheries such as Nouaceur or Skhirat-Témara.

Fewer seats in a constituency intensifies electoral competition, favoring well-established parties with substantial financial resources and mobilization networks—such as the current coalition partners: RNI, PAM, and Istiqlal. Conversely, more seats per constituency lower the threshold for parliamentary entry via the “largest remainder” mechanism, offering smaller parties better chances.

Rural anchoring and voter turnout distortion

Despite urban growth, many city residents remain registered and vote in their rural hometowns to preserve local influence networks. This explains the traditionally high turnout rates in rural areas, sometimes exceeding 90% of registered voters, compared to the high abstention levels in urban centers—often surpassing 70% to 80% in middle-class districts.

In this transitional context, voter registration and list revision campaigns are underway. Beyond registering new voters, these efforts aim to update records for citizens who have relocated from urban centers to booming peripheries, correct registration errors, and enhance the reliability of the electoral roll ahead of the September 23, 2026 legislative elections.

Legislative elections 2026: the urban middle class and abstention challenge

The demographic data presents strategic challenges for the upcoming vote, as David Goeury has noted. Key considerations include:

  • Mobilizing the urban middle class: Hit hard by inflation and feeling overlooked by recent targeted social aid reforms, the middle class in major urban centers largely abstained in 2021. Their potential return to polling stations in 2026, whether through protest voting or support for alternative platforms, could shift political balances.
  • Political positioning: The ruling coalition parties must defend their economic and social records in a post-inflation environment, while opposition groups like the PJD seek to capitalize on urban discontent and rekindle support among disappointed local activists.

Ultimately, reconciling the demographic realities revealed by the 2024 census with the need to preserve territorial equity will require precise political maneuvering. Though no official announcement on electoral boundary revisions has been made, the new population figures have set the stage for an inevitable technical and political debate ahead of the 2026 legislative elections.