Burkina Faso’s delicate path: navigating the post-compaoré transition

The definition of a power seizure often shifts, influenced by the shifting political will and perceived interests of the international community, frequently endorsed by neighboring states. In Burkina Faso, the ‘designation’ of Transitional President Michel Kafando raised constitutional questions, establishing a government framework that would operate for at least twelve months with newly constructed institutions.

Much like a carefully assembled structure, the transitional institutions are progressively taking shape. Since the military’s emergence on the public stage, following the swift departure of the long-serving leader from Kosyam, Ouagadougou appears to have regained a degree of stability.

Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida, seemingly from obscurity, quickly dominated the political landscape, assuming the full authority of a Head of State. His true intentions remained a subject of intense speculation. How did he manage to integrate himself among the demonstrators and political party leaders? Was his deployment to the Place de la Révolution, perhaps, a pre-arranged strategy between President Blaise Compaoré and General Gilbert Diendéré to maintain control over the government? Initially, an officer from the Presidential Security Regiment (RSP) aligning with the populace naturally sparked skepticism and deep suspicion. The military’s initial actions, including the suspension of the Constitution and dissolution of the National Assembly, fueled fears of a looming junta, threatening to strip the people, who had sacrificed and shed blood, of their hard-won victory.

True to form, the African Union promptly threatened sanctions against Burkina Faso. Simultaneously, a delegation of ECOWAS heads of state – including John Dramani Mahama of Ghana, Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria, and Macky Sall of Senegal – arrived to engage with the military leadership, urging them to soften their stance. The precedents set by military leaders like Daddis Camara in Guinea and Sanogo in Mali undoubtedly prompted Burkinabé officers to reconsider. They understood that seizing power by force would no longer go unpunished, and a protracted crisis resolution process risked isolating the nation and fostering widespread unpopularity.

Ultimately, the army negotiated a compromise solution, formalized in the Transition Charter. The agreement stipulated that a civilian would lead the Executive as President of the Transition, while the military would retain significant influence within the government. A 90-member legislative body, the National Transition Council (CNT), was established to accommodate key figures who spearheaded the struggle. A 20-member Designation Committee was tasked with the crucial responsibility of appointing a Transitional President of the Republic. This interim arrangement was set to conclude in November 2015, coinciding with the end of former President Blaise Compaoré’s original mandate.

For the presidential appointment, each vital national component – the military, civil society, opposition parties, religious, and traditional authorities – submitted a shortlist within a specified timeframe. Five personalities were ultimately selected:

The opposition and civil society put forward two journalists: Newton Ahmed Barry, editor of the weekly L’Evènement, and Chériff Sy Moumina, publishing director of the weekly Bendré. Their legitimacy stemmed from their media outlets’ critical stance against the former regime. The military adopted a broader approach, diversifying its candidate profiles: an ecclesiastic, Archbishop Mgr Ouédraogo of Bobo Dioulasso; a diplomat, Michel Kafando; and a woman, former minister Joséphine Ouédraogo. Early on, Archbishop Ouédraogo, initially a strong contender, publicly declined interest, preferring to focus on his current ministry.

The remaining two candidates held a distinct advantage: their extensive experience within major international institutions. Madame Joséphine Ouédraogo had served at the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), while Michel Kafando had twice represented Burkina Faso at the UN Headquarters in New York, from 1981 to 1982 and again from 1998 to 2011. In the ‘Land of the Upright People,’ an invisible divide often separates society into those for or against Sankara. This implicit ideological split has historically influenced every political figure’s trajectory. Joséphine Ouédraogo served as Minister of Family Development and Solidarity between 1984 and 1987. Michel Kafando, on the other hand, was Minister of Foreign Affairs under Prime Minister Thomas Sankara’s government in 1982, during Jean-Baptiste Ouedraougou’s presidency. Reports suggest some disagreements between the two men regarding the conduct of Upper Volta’s diplomacy, and they were said to be ideologically diametrically opposed.

A career in an international institution offers dual benefits: an enhanced resume and an expanded network of contacts. This proved to be a disadvantage for the two aspiring journalists presented by the opposition.

For a limited period, Michel Kafando, the retired diplomat, was compelled to set aside his cattle and poultry farming in Saponé for a greater purpose: to safeguard the nation in crisis! He would concurrently hold the Presidency of the Transition and the portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs. This dual role streamlined diplomatic channels, providing a single interlocutor and effectively circumventing the head of government, Isaac Zida.

Burkina Faso’s evolving situation was closely monitored by several capitals: Accra, which currently chairs ECOWAS; Addis Ababa for the African Union; and Paris and Washington for geopolitical reasons. On the day of Michel Kafando’s inauguration, several Heads of State – from Mauritania (AU), Ghana (ECOWAS), Togo, Bénin, Mali, Niger – attended, a clear gesture to rehabilitate Burkina Faso’s international standing. Did this significant representation implicitly endorse the reinstatement of a constitution that had been suspended just weeks prior? The United States typically adheres to a principle of not cooperating with heads of state who have not received a popular mandate, a situation currently applicable to Burkina Faso. The international community thus navigated a pragmatic path, effectively legitimizing the power change and re-establishing a semblance of constitutional order. This ensured that American reconnaissance aircraft could remain stationed in Ouagadougou, as Uncle Sam relies on Mauritania and Burkina Faso as vital strategic footholds for monitoring the Sahel region.

Out of 26 ministerial positions, the army secured four critical portfolios: the Prime Minister also assumed the Ministry of Defense; Colonel Auguste Denise Barry, a former Security Minister in 2011, took charge of Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Security (MATDS); Colonel David Kabré, spokesperson for Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida, became Minister of Sports; and Boubacar Ba was appointed to the highly strategic Ministry of Mines and Energy. Joséphine Ouédraogo was given the position of Keeper of the Seals – perhaps as a consolation – while Augustin Loada, a university professor and prominent civil society figure, was named to the Civil Service. Adama Sagnon, who inherited the Ministry of Culture, resigned a few days after his appointment due to intense pressure from civil society, which criticized him for having ‘shelved’ the Norbert Zongo case as a former prosecutor.

The National Transition Council (CNT), the interim legislative body, elected one of the unsuccessful presidential transition candidates, Chériff Sy Moumina, as its president. He was chosen by his peers with 71 votes out of 90. The next crucial steps involve completing the institutional framework and mechanisms necessary to guide Burkina Faso towards transparent and equitable elections, including establishing the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), drafting a new electoral code, and enacting organic laws.

what missions for this brief transitional period?

Since the beginning of December, Michel Kafando has signed the presidential decree establishing the Commission for National Reconciliation and Reforms (CRNR). The scope and duration of this body’s mandate are key questions. More than 27 years after Thomas Sankara’s assassination, the nation of the ‘Upright People’ finally seeks to embark on a process of catharsis. Shortly after his appointment, one of President Michel Kafando’s initial decisions was to authorize investigations to identify Thomas Sankara’s remains. Prime Minister Isaac Zida also announced that the file on President Thomas Sankara’s assassination would be ‘fully opened,’ adding that Burkina Faso would, if necessary, request Morocco’s ‘extradition’ of former President Blaise Compaoré.

Through a series of public announcements, the current leaders have effectively opened a Pandora’s Box. Such complex cases demand a considerable amount of time, likely extending beyond the transitional period. Were these declarations made to reassure opponents of the Blaise Compaoré regime? As Minister of Defense, army reform should have been Isaac Zida’s priority. In this context, General Gilbert Diendéré – Blaise Compaoré’s special chief of staff and thus Isaac Zida’s direct superior – was relieved of his duties by President Michel Kafando. He was replaced by Commander Théophile Nikièma, a former head of the RSP’s ‘Operations and Instruction’ Bureau and director of External Documentation, essentially the intelligence service of the Kosyam palace.

Will Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida and Commander Théophile Nikièma remain loyal to General Gilbert Diendéré? Burkina Faso successfully defused the political crisis of October 30, which led to Blaise Compaoré’s downfall, with relatively few major incidents. The intervention of RSP elements during the initial clashes could have easily triggered a civil war. Would it not be more prudent to concentrate on holding elections rather than implicating General Gilbert Diendéré and other still-living civilian and military figures by exhuming the Sankara file?

How can a ‘witch hunt’ be avoided? Two general managers of major national companies, considered close to the family of the deposed president, have already been dismissed: Jean-Baptiste Bérehoundougou from the National Burkinabé Hydrocarbons Company (SONABHY) and Jean Christophe Ilboudo from the National Burkinabé Electricity Company (SONABEL). An act of contrition, while not fully absolving past transgressions, contributes to reconciliation; this was the recent approach taken by Gilbert Noël Ouédraogo of the Alliance for Democracy and Federation – African Democratic Rally (ADF-RDA), a political party affiliated with the former presidential movement. Similarly, the nation paid tribute to the seven individuals who lost their lives during the events of October 30 and 31, now laid to rest in the Gounghin cemetery.

Will the CRNR endure beyond the end of the transitional period? Now that all institutions are established, political figures and parties will soon take center stage. No prominent political leader sought a seat within either the Executive or the CNT, which effectively disqualifies them from running in universal suffrage elections. Presidential candidates are already poised for the race. The creation of the CNT also marked the occasion for the CFOP, the opposition coalition, to dissolve itself. The electoral battle is certainly expected to commence early in 2015.