Niger’s endless war spiral: a cycle of violence unchanged by regime change

Despite shifts in leadership and dramatic geopolitical realignments, Niamey remains trapped in a war of attrition. From Mahamadou Issoufou’s western alliance strategy to Abdourahamane Tiani’s sovereignist break, the harsh reality persists: on the ground, the terrorist threat shows no sign of retreat.

Three presidents, two democratic transitions, one coup d’état — and one constant: bloodshed in the three-border area and the Lake Chad basin. In Niger, governments come and go, but the jihadist hydra, represented by the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (GSIM), remains entrenched.

The National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP), which has ruled since July 2023, vowed to restore security by expelling western partners. Now the country faces a harsh return to reality — time to take stock of a war that, so far, seems unwinnable.

The Issoufou-Bazoum era: the illusion of a western shield

Under President Mahamadou Issoufou (2011-2021), Niger positioned itself as the linchpin of western strategy in the Sahel. As the Malian state disintegrated, Niamey became the military hub for France’s Operation Barkhane and the United States’ drone base at Agadez.

His successor, Mohamed Bazoum, attempted to add a layer of political flexibility:

• An “olive branch” approach by starting dialogues with some repentant fighters.
• Massive investment in training Nigerien special forces.

The downside: while this strategy prevented the country’s collapse, it never eliminated the threat. Worse, the presence of foreign troops fueled deep frustration within part of the army and population, who saw it as a loss of sovereignty for insufficient results.

Tiani’s gamble: sovereignty tested by bullets

By overthrowing Mohamed Bazoum on July 26, 2023, General Abdourahamane Tiani and the CNSP justified their coup with “the continuous deterioration of the security situation.” What followed is well known: a dramatic break with Paris and Washington, creation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) with Mali and Burkina Faso, and strategic rapprochement with Russia (through the Africa Corps) and Turkey.

On the communication front, the change is radical. The military rulers exalt national pride and promise a purely military response, free from western “hidden agendas.”

But the harsh ground reality: the departure of western forces created an immediate capability gap, especially in aerial intelligence and technological surveillance. Complex attacks have increased, sometimes targeting entire Nigerien army garrisons and causing heavy losses. The subsequent economic blockade in some regions and diplomatic isolation complicate the logistics funding for a war costing millions of dollars daily.

Why is Niger stuck in this deadlock?

The common mistake of successive regimes — whether civilian or military — lies in treating a primarily political and social crisis with a military approach. Two major visions have failed:

On one side, the Issoufou-Bazoum doctrine bet everything on integration into the international security architecture. Its major flaw was excessive external dependence, disconnected from popular aspirations, making the French narrative inaudible to much of the Nigerien public.

On the other side, the Tiani doctrine favors a total geopolitical break and a martial sovereignty embodied by the AES. The limits of this formula are already visible on the ground: an immediate loss of advanced technological intelligence, asphyxiating financial isolation, and paradoxically, an escalation of violence by armed groups exploiting regional disorganization.

In both cases, the root causes remain unchanged: the absence of the state in peripheral areas, lack of economic prospects for rural youth, and intercommunity conflicts (especially between herders and farmers) that jihadist groups skillfully exploit for recruitment.

Whether waged to the tune of international cooperation or under the banners of AES sovereignty, the war in Niger cannot be won by weapons alone. For General Tiani, the challenge is no longer just to criticize his predecessors’ record, but to prove that the current military formula can protect Nigeriens. Without a massive reintroduction of public services (schools, justice, clinics) in insecure zones, Niger risks seeing this war truly lost in the long term.