Sahel instability rising as jihadist threats and military coups escalate

The Sahel’s silent crisis: escalating violence and authoritarian shifts

The Sahel has faded from global headlines, yet its crises persist unabated. While global attention shifted to conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and the Democratic Republic of Congo—alongside geopolitical upheavals in the United States—the Sahel’s deepening instability remains largely overlooked. For over a decade, this region has been gripped by a complex web of jihadist insurgencies, military coups, and democratic backsliding. Despite promises from military regimes to restore peace, violence has surged, particularly in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso—the core members of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).

The Sahel now stands as the world’s most jihadist-affected region, with violence escalating dramatically. Since 2021, deaths from terrorism have tripled, reaching over 11,200 in 2024. Shockingly, state security forces and their Russian allies may have caused more civilian fatalities than armed jihadist groups—a stark indicator of the region’s deteriorating security landscape.

Mali: between jihadist advances and military setbacks

Since the 2020 coup, Mali’s military regime has struggled to contain jihadist expansion. The withdrawal of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in 2023 coincided with renewed clashes between government forces and Tuareg separatists, backed by Russian mercenaries. The seizure of Kidal in October 2023—a stronghold held by rebels for a decade—was framed as a sovereignty victory, yet failed to alter the military balance.

Jihadist groups, particularly the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM, linked to Al-Qaeda), have demonstrated alarming tactical sophistication. In September 2024, simultaneous attacks on a gendarmerie school and Bamako’s military airport killed over 70 soldiers and destroyed a presidential aircraft. These strikes, targeting only military sites, suggest an effort to gain popular support rather than spread fear—a contrast to the Islamic State in the Sahel’s brutal tactics. Civilian casualties have surged, including a July 2024 wedding attack that killed 40 and military drone strikes in August that claimed over 20 lives. Despite these setbacks, polls show Malians retain misplaced confidence in their armed forces.

Burkina Faso: jihadists tightening their grip amid state repression

Burkina Faso’s security situation has worsened since the 2022 coup. By 2024, the state reportedly lost control of 60% of its territory, with JNIM active in 11 of 13 regions. The most lethal attack in the country’s history occurred in August 2024 in Barsalogho, where jihadists targeted civilians forced to dig trenches for the army, killing between 130 and 600 people. State forces have also been implicated in atrocities, including the summary execution of 223 civilians in February 2024 and reports of soldiers mutilating corpses.

The regime’s controversial strategy of arming civilians—escalated after the 2022 coup—has fueled ethnic tensions and intercommunal violence. The Voluntaries for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) militia, recruited primarily from non-Peul communities, has become a target for jihadist retaliation. Over 2 million people have been displaced, making Burkina Faso the region’s worst-hit country in terms of internal displacement.

Niger: rising jihadist lethality despite relative stability

Niger, once comparatively resilient to jihadist attacks, has seen a sharp increase in violence since its 2023 coup. State forces killed three times more civilians in the aftermath than in the previous year, placing populations between the crossfire of armed groups and security forces. In March 2024, at least 23 soldiers died in an ambush near the Burkina Faso border, followed by December attacks that killed 39 civilians. By March 2025, an Islamic State attack on a mosque left 44 dead. The military’s intensified operations have not stemmed the tide, with state forces facing 51 attacks in nine months of 2024—nearly double 2023’s figures.

Eroding democracies: military regimes prolong their grip

The AES’s military regimes have systematically delayed elections and extended their transitions to consolidate power. Mali’s junta, which seized control in August 2020, initially pledged elections within 18 months but repeatedly postponed them. By May 2024, a national dialogue proposed a two-to-five-year transition, potentially keeping the junta leader in power until 2029. In Burkina Faso, Captain Traoré extended his transition to 60 months, while Niger’s junta recommended a renewable five-year transition in early 2025. All three regimes have promoted themselves to top military ranks, signaling their entrenched authority.

These prolonged transitions serve a dual purpose: they allow regimes to deepen ties with alternative partners like Russia—recently pledging military backing for the AES’s joint force—and to distance themselves from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), avoiding economic and political consequences. The EU must adapt its engagement to this new reality, balancing strategic interests with the urgent needs of Sahelian populations.

Information control: the new weapon of Sahelian regimes

Facing territorial losses, the AES regimes have turned to silencing dissent through media repression. Independent and foreign outlets, including Radio France Internationale (RFI) and France 24, have been banned across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Journalists face arbitrary arrests, forced conscription, and expulsion, while civil society organizations and opposition parties are systematically suppressed.

In Mali, the junta has revoked licenses of critical media outlets, expelled UN human rights officials, and suspended civil society groups. Burkina Faso’s regime has expelled foreign journalists, banned French publications, and detained local reporters under military supervision. Niger’s coup leaders swiftly suspended RFI and France 24, followed by closures of domestic media and arrests of critics. By October 2024, the junta began restricting foreign passport holders’ movements, tightening control over external actors.

These measures reflect a broader strategy: by controlling information, regimes shape public perception. In October 2024, Burkina Faso’s government claimed it controlled 70% of its territory—a figure matching estimates of jihadist dominance. For citizens, distinguishing fact from propaganda grows increasingly difficult in this climate of misinformation.

Why the Sahel demands global attention

The Sahel’s crises extend far beyond its borders. Over 52.7 million people in West Africa face acute food insecurity between June and August 2025, while internal displacement has reached 3.1 million in Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, and Chad alone. Yet international focus has waned, overshadowed by other global conflicts and the EU’s reduced presence in the region.

While the EU reconsiders its approach—marked by France’s quieter role—it must not abandon the Sahel. Disengagement risks ceding influence to new partners in a region where security vacuums breed instability. Europe’s strategic re-engagement should prioritize humanitarian aid, human rights protections, and dialogue with civil society. The Sahel’s fate is intertwined with Europe’s: ignoring it today could mean confronting its consequences tomorrow.