A violent showdown in Tessit exposes the widening gap between military promises and reality
On the morning of Friday, 9 October 2026, heavy fighting broke out between the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Sahel (IS-S) in the Tessit area, close to the Burkina Faso border. The two rival organisations issued conflicting claims about the outcome. What is beyond dispute is that armed groups are still able to move, organise, and fight across the very territories the military authorities of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger say they intend to secure.
This is a moment of reckoning. The clashes mark a clear turning point: the persistence of these groups on the ground is no longer a distant security challenge but an immediate test of whether the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) juntas can deliver what they promised when they seized power.
Contradictory claims, one undeniable fact
Sources close to JNIM said the rival organisation suffered a heavy defeat on several fronts. Sources linked to IS-S, meanwhile, claimed to have routed JNIM and captured new territory. Neither account, on its own, establishes the true outcome of the fighting. But both reveal a troubling reality: armed groups are still competing for control of Sahelian territory while civilians bear the brunt displacement, insecurity, and the daily consequences of a war that shows no sign of ending.
An unresolved challenge the juntas can no longer deflect
These clashes lay bare a fundamental contradiction in the security narrative of the military regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Since taking power, the juntas have made the recovery of sovereignty and the fight against terrorism central pillars of their legitimacy. Yet the continued presence of armed groups, their freedom of movement, and their capacity to fight one another raise hard questions about the effectiveness of the strategies deployed so far.
The core problem is not simply that terrorist groups exist. It is that states struggle persistently to prevent them from establishing a lasting presence on their own soil. Tessit is a case in point: while the two organisations jockey for position, local populations continue to suffer from insecurity that repeated promises of restored order have failed to eliminate.
AES authorities regularly denounce foreign interference and accuse neighbouring countries depending on the circumstances of facilitating armed group activity or providing rear bases for fighters. Such accusations must be weighed against verifiable evidence. The presence of terrorist groups on a country’s territory does not, by itself, prove that its leaders voluntarily support or host them.
One question remains unavoidable: how can military governments justify their security record when armed groups continue to operate in areas where the state struggles to restore lasting authority?
Between sovereignty rhetoric and ground realities
One of the principal challenges for Sahelian military regimes is now to demonstrate that their strategic choices are producing tangible results. The switch in military partners, the departure of Western forces, and the rapprochement with Russia were presented as ways to regain control of the security situation.
But these shifts alone are not enough to eliminate armed groups. Persistent difficulties in Mali and violence across various Sahelian regions are a reminder that counterterrorism also depends on intelligence, an effective administrative presence, civilian protection, and the ability of security forces to hold recaptured territory.
A 2026 United Nations report described sustained activity by JNIM and the Islamic State in the Sahel, particularly in the Tessit and Ménaka areas of Mali, as well as in parts of Niger and Burkina Faso. It also noted clashes between these organisations over territorial control.
This reality undermines narratives that frame security failures exclusively as the product of external manoeuvres. Regional and cross-border factors are real, but they do not absolve any government of responsibility for its own results.
The political dimension: security and staying in power
Managing the terrorist threat also raises a broader political question: how can a country prevent persistent insecurity from becoming a permanent justification for concentrating power and postponing a return to normal constitutional order?
It would be reckless to assert, without evidence, that AES leaders knowingly host or nurture terrorist groups in order to stay in power. Such an accusation requires concrete, independent, and verifiable proof.
It is nonetheless legitimate to examine the political consequences of a situation in which the security threat remains omnipresent while military authorities continue to present counterterrorism as a major justification for their governance.
The distinction matters: denouncing the possible political exploitation of insecurity is not the same as claiming that leaders themselves orchestrate that insecurity. The first is political analysis; the second demands evidence.
Populations want results, not explanations
In Tessit, the opposing claims by JNIM and the Islamic State do not yet allow a definitive conclusion about who won the 9 October clashes. But that uncertainty does nothing to change the central issue: these organisations remain capable of mounting operations and contesting control of certain areas.
For residents, the consequences are tangible. Insecurity disrupts travel, hampers economic activity, and complicates access to essential services. Talk of sovereignty, international alliances, and external enemies cannot indefinitely substitute for measurable results on the ground.
The governments of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger therefore face a simple demand: prove their ability to protect populations, prevent armed groups from establishing a lasting presence, and restore an effective public presence in affected areas.
Sovereignty is not measured solely by the partners a government chooses or the foreign forces it expels. It is also measured by a state’s capacity to protect its citizens on its own territory.
As long as armed groups continue to fight over territory in the Sahel, AES authorities will have to answer a fundamental question: beyond rhetoric and accusations directed outward, what durable results can they demonstrate to guarantee the security of their people?
By Emmanuel Mbarga — Journaliste / Rédacteur