Senegal’s political-religious dynamic: formalizing state-faith relations

In Senegal, religion extends far beyond the private sphere, actively contributing to social cohesion, mediating conflicts, shaping education, and at times, influencing political regulation. Despite this profound societal role, the interactions between the State and religious communities largely operate on informal practices. This raises a critical question: can the formalization of religious affairs help transcend clientelism without undermining the nation’s secular principles? The core challenge may no longer be whether to institutionalize state-religion relations, but rather how to achieve this without inadvertently institutionalizing religion itself.

First, a common misconception must be addressed: formalizing the ties between the State and religious communities does not automatically imply transforming religion into a state affair. Several African nations have already opted to establish public structures dedicated to religious matters.

Mali, for instance, operates with a Ministry of Religious Affairs, Worship, and Customs; Guinea has a General Secretariat for Religious Affairs; and Côte d’Ivoire maintains a specific administration overseeing religious worship. Morocco has taken this institutionalization much further through its Supreme Council of Ulemas and the function of Amir Al-Mouminine.

Senegal itself has embarked on a nascent path toward institutionalization. The creation of the Directorate of Religious Affairs and the Integration of Arabic Language Graduates in April 2024 marked an initial step. Its director, Djim Dramé, openly confirms the objective: to precisely “formalize relations between the State and religions” and to foster peace, harmony, and coexistence. The current debate, therefore, centers less on the desirability of an administration for religious affairs and more on the degree of institutionalization Senegal wishes to implement.

Islamologist Abdoul Aziz Kébé views the announced transformation of the Directorate of Religious Affairs into a General Delegation as a “positive evolution” and an “institutional elevation.” His argument is particularly compelling: “religion is a resource in our country,” notably for social cohesion and the adoption of public policies.

If religion already serves as a significant social, cultural, and even political resource for Senegal, why persist in managing its relationship with the State primarily through personal connections, courtesy visits, ad-hoc delegations, and circumstantial arrangements? It is within this framework that Ousmane Sonko’s proposal should be understood.

He champions a genuine institutionalization of the relationship between the State and religious communities, articulated around several key propositions: creating a dedicated budget for religious affairs, elevating the Delegation for Religious Affairs into a Secretary of State or a full ministry, officially recognizing certain provisions granted to religious leaders, and regulating special funds through a commission of sworn individuals.

A ‘laïcité of collaboration’ between politics and religion

The logic is unambiguous: to move beyond a system of discretionary favors towards one governed by predefined rights and transparent rules. When a religious leader obtains an administrative concession because of their proximity to the President, it constitutes a favor. However, if that same concession is regulated by a clear text, with explicitly defined conditions applicable to all leaders meeting the same criteria, it enters an institutional framework. The State’s role, therefore, should not be to control religious matters, but to establish a structure that organizes its interactions with them.

Senegal is a secular state. This constitutional reality can neither be circumvented nor relativized. The Constitution affirms that the Republic is secular, democratic, and social, ensuring equality among citizens without religious distinction and respecting all beliefs. The institutionalization of religious affairs, therefore, cannot lead to any form of state religion.

Yet, the question remains whether secularism prohibits the State from organizing its relationships with religions. Political science professor Maurice Soudieck Dione aptly demonstrates that Senegalese secularism possesses a unique history. It does not perfectly align with the strict French model of separation. He characterizes it as a “laïcité of collaboration between the political and the religious.” Thus, the distinctiveness of the Senegalese model lies in its operation through “pragmatic accommodation” with confraternities and the Church.

However, the debate cannot be reduced to: “since religion holds a significant place in society, a Ministry of Worship must be created.” Seydou Ka, a journalist-columnist for Le Soleil, rightly warns against the risk of transforming secularism into a form of administrative control over religious matters. He expresses concern about a “bureaucratization of the sacred” and a potential drift towards “laïcisme” that would weaken the autonomy of religious leaders.

This observation is fundamental, as there is a clear distinction between institutionalizing relations with religions and institutionalizing religions themselves. In the former case, the State creates an administrative interlocutor. In the latter, it gradually begins to define who is legitimate, who can speak on behalf of a community, which activities should be authorized, how places of worship should operate, and which religious leaders can benefit from public recognition.

The fear of ‘bureaucratization of the sacred’

The State’s desire to organize religions themselves can pose a clear risk, potentially leading to a fundamental change in their nature. Researcher Bakary Sambe perfectly summarized the danger of the political-religious relationship in Senegal. He observes that “our leaders seek in the religious a legitimacy they lack in the political.” The danger of institutionalization would be precisely to transform an already clientelistic relationship into a bureaucratized form of clientelism. Instead of politicians sporadically seeking the blessing of religious figures, permanent mechanisms for the distribution of public resources could emerge.

It is precisely because these risks exist that I believe institutionalization is necessary. Today, a significant portion of the interactions between the State and religious authorities is personalized. A president maintains a particular relationship with a certain khalife. A minister is close to a specific religious family. A community more easily obtains certain investments due to its religious influence.

A major religious event receives specific support because of its significance. Therefore, the question arises: is it better to leave these practices informal or subject them to public rules? In my opinion, it is better to institutionalize them. But with an important clarification: one must not institutionalize faith; one must institutionalize the State’s relationship with the religious phenomenon.

This is also what Djim Dramé seems to advocate when he states that the Directorate of Religious Affairs aims to listen to “all religious sensitivities” and formalize relations between the State and religions. The National Council of Laity has, moreover, expressed support for this approach, considering that the Directorate could become an effective interface between the Church and the State. Its president, Philippe Abraham Tine, however, insisted on the need to clearly explain the role of this structure to avoid misunderstandings. This interfaith dimension is fundamental.

Senegal is a massively believing society. Muslims constitute a vast majority, while Christian communities have a considerable historical and social presence. This socio-historical reality merits an institutional response. If the State supports citizens in education, health, culture, or sport, why should it consider the religious fact as a reality it can never institutionally account for?

A public policy for religious affairs

The State can support pilgrimages, contribute to the security of major religious events, foster training, participate in the renovation of certain places of worship, or assist religious institutions, provided that the rules are transparent and the same principles of equity are applied. Islamologist Abdoul Aziz Kébé specifically emphasizes the goal of supporting “Muslim, Christian, and traditional religious” communities in the exercise of their worship and their development. Fundamentally, Ousmane Sonko’s proposal opens a debate far more significant than a simple administrative question.

It compels Senegal to reflect on its own model of secularism. Seydou Ka reminds us of the risk of the bureaucratization of the sacred. Étienne Smith invites us to consider “proportional equidistance.” Seydi Diamil Niane insists on the necessity of institutionalizing relations between public authorities and religious leaders. Maurice Soudieck Dione demonstrates a particular collaboration between the political and the religious.

The experiences of Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Guinea, Niger, and Burkina Faso each illustrate, in their own way, various methods of organizing these relationships. Sonko, however, poses another question: why continue to manage by favor what could be organized by law? This is where the true interest of his proposition lies. Provided, however, that a fundamental error is not committed: institutionalizing religious practice must not mean state control of religion. The State must remain secular. Religions must remain autonomous. And citizens must be able to practice their faith freely.

Thus, I would not necessarily advocate for a “Ministry of Religion,” which could give the impression that the State is managing the spiritual realm. I would rather champion a republican institution tasked with organizing, transparently and equitably, the relationships between the State and religious communities. For Senegal cannot act as if religion does not exist.

The question is therefore no longer whether to institutionalize the religious fact, but how to institutionalize it without losing what makes Senegalese secularism unique. And in my opinion, the correct answer lies in one formula: do not institutionalize faith. Institutionalize relations with faith. This is the only path allowing for the reconciliation of republican secularism, religious freedom, confessional equity, and the autonomy of religious communities.