What the Niger mutiny means for Tiani’s grip on power

The return of silence to Niamey’s streets should not deceive anyone.

The battle is over, but the political war is only just beginning.

During the night of August 28-29, Nigerien soldiers attempted to overthrow General Abdourahamane Tiani’s regime. The attack, launched in part by troops from units engaged on various fronts across the country, targeted strategic installations in the capital, notably Air Base 101 and areas near the presidential palace.

For several hours, the government wavered.

To save it, Tiani had to call on his Russian allies.

The men of Africa Corps, heirs of the Wagner system in Africa, intervened alongside loyalist Nigerien forces. They participated in retaking the air base and neutralizing the mutinous soldiers. It was confirmed that the Nigerien army regained control of the base with the support of Russian paramilitary forces.

Herein lies the major political fact of this crisis: Nigerien soldiers were fought on Nigerien territory with the direct support of Russian forces called in to protect the regime born of the 2023 coup.

The junta had made national sovereignty its main argument for driving out French and American forces.

Sovereignty with variable geometry

For years, Tiani and his supporters told Nigeriens that the French military presence was an humiliation and an affront to national sovereignty.

The French soldiers left.

The Americans were asked to leave the country.

Western military agreements were denounced.

The regime’s propaganda could then proclaim that Niger had finally regained its full independence.

But an embarrassing question now arises: what is the point of chasing out the French military if, a few years later, the government must call on Russian military to save its presidential seat?

The question is all the more explosive because the Russians did not intervene to defend Nigerien territory against jihadist groups. They intervened to help the government repel Nigerien soldiers who threatened the regime.

The symbolism is devastating.

Nigerien soldiers have been dying for years in the Sahel’s war zones. They fight the Islamic State and JNIM, suffer heavy losses, and regularly denounce their combat conditions. The Niamey mutiny seems to have been fueled precisely by this accumulated frustration within units facing jihadist violence daily.

And when these very soldiers end up turning against the government, it is the Russians who come to fight them.

What sovereignty remains when the national government can no longer ensure its own survival without foreign protection?

The fracture between Tiani and his army

The August 29 mutiny is likely the most serious warning signal sent to Tiani since he came to power.

The problem is not only that soldiers attempted to overthrow him.

The problem is that they were able to do so while Niger officially has a considerable security apparatus.

Above all, the dissent seems to have found fertile ground within the ranks of the regular army itself.

Soldiers engaged on the fronts are those paying the highest price of war. They watch their comrades fall. They see material difficulties. They see jihadist attacks continuing despite the junta’s promises.

Since 2023, Tiani promised to restore security and return dignity to Niger.

Three years later, jihadist violence remains a major threat and Nigerien forces continue to suffer significant losses.

It is in this context that a part of the army seems to be wondering whether the regime has drifted away from those who are actually fighting on the ground.

And the Russian intervention could have turned this frustration into hatred.

For a Nigerien soldier may accept dying to defend his country. He can accept deprivation and sacrifice in the name of the nation.

But it will be much harder for him to accept that foreigners come to fire against him to protect a political regime.

Tiani, from Bazoum’s toppler to Moscow’s protégé

The historical paradox is dizzying.

In July 2023, Tiani seized power claiming he wanted to save Niger from a political system incapable of ensuring the safety of its citizens.

He overthrew Mohamed Bazoum, the democratically elected president, claiming to end the failure of civilian rule.

Today, three years later, it is his own government that needs foreign fighters to withstand a military revolt.

The trajectory is hard to ignore.

Tiani came to power through a coup.

He now stays in power thanks to a security apparatus whose essential component is Russian.

In other words, the one who claimed to free Niger from foreign tutelage seems to have replaced a Western dependency with a Russian one.

It is precisely this contradiction that could become the regime’s Achilles’ heel.

And if Bazoum had accepted French help?

We must also look back to July 2023.

When Tiani overthrew Mohamed Bazoum, France still had more than a thousand soldiers in Niger. Paris supported the elected president and considered, under certain circumstances, an operation to contribute to his liberation.

Close associates of Bazoum had requested French intervention. According to information available at the time, an operation was considered, but Bazoum reportedly favored dialogue and refused direct French military intervention.

That decision now belongs to history.

But one question remains: if Bazoum had accepted the French intervention, would Tiani have succeeded in his coup?

No one can rewrite history with certainty.

But it is perfectly legitimate to note that Tiani benefited from this hesitation. The elected president remained a prisoner in the presidential palace while the junta gradually consolidated its control over the state apparatus.

The irony is that today, the one who denounced the French presence in Niger calls on a foreign power to save his own government.

Algeria enters the fray

As if the Russian presence were not enough, Algeria has just taken a new step.

After the attempt to overthrow Tiani, Algiers deployed military assets to Niamey, including combat and transport aircraft. This decision marks a significant shift in Algerian doctrine, long marked by reluctance to commit its forces beyond its borders.

Algeria ultimately did not have to do battle against the mutineers: they had already been repelled with the help of Russian forces.

But the message was clear.

Tiani would no longer be alone.

Moscow militarily protects the regime. Algiers now provides strategic support. And the junta can present this encirclement as proof that Niger has new allies.

But behind this show of force hides a troubling question: how many foreign powers will it take to protect a government that seems to be gradually losing the support of part of its own army?

The volcano beneath the barracks

The August 29 mutiny may therefore not be an isolated incident.

It could be the first symptom of a much deeper rupture.

Russian weapons allowed Tiani to win one battle.

They did not resolve the frustrations of Nigerien soldiers.

They did not destroy the jihadist groups.

They did not bring back the soldiers who died at the front.

They did not reconcile the troops with the government.

They simply allowed the regime to survive a first overthrow attempt.

And that is precisely where the danger lies for Tiani.

For a regime can control a palace with the help of foreign forces. It can retake a military base. It can arrest mutineers.

But it cannot indefinitely rule against an army that is beginning to view its own government as dependent on a foreign power.

General Tiani should therefore look beyond the walls of his palace.

The real danger to his regime may lie neither in Paris, nor in Washington, nor in the Western capitals he regularly accuses of conspiring against him.

It may lie in the Nigerien barracks.

And if the soldiers who watched their comrades fall under the bullets of foreign forces one day decide to settle scores with those they accuse of handing their country to Moscow, the next mutiny could be far more difficult to contain.

The Russians can protect Tiani.

Algeria can lend him support.

But no foreign power can forever replace the loyalty of a national army.

Tiani’s regime may have won the battle of August 29. But it may have lost something far more precious: the trust of part of those who wear the Nigerien uniform.