Spain’s opposition faces its biggest diplomatic dilemma with Morocco

In an unprecedented move in Spanish foreign policy, the country’s foreign minister has accused the main opposition party, the Partido Popular (PP), of adopting an ‘anti-Moroccan stance’, escalating tensions between government and opposition beyond a typical political feud.

The minister argues that the PP is weaponizing Spain’s external relations—particularly its ties with Morocco—to serve domestic political ends. Recent declarations from current and former PP officials have intensified these tensions, with the foreign minister going so far as to label the opposition an ‘obstacle’ to Spain’s foreign policy objectives.

Behind this political clash lies a far more consequential reality. Since 2022, Spain and Morocco have forged a strategic partnership spanning migration control, economic cooperation, trade, security, and defense. This alliance was further solidified in late 2025 with fourteen new bilateral agreements and a joint declaration, alongside plans to co-host the 2030 FIFA World Cup with Portugal. The question now looms: if the PP wins the next election, how will it manage a relationship it has so fiercely criticized from the sidelines?

Sahara conflict: the pp’s shifting stance

At the heart of the PP’s dilemma is the Sahara issue. In March 2022, the Spanish government endorsed Morocco’s autonomy plan as the ‘most serious, credible, and realistic basis’ for resolving the dispute. The PP, then led by Alberto Núñez Feijóo, condemned the decision, arguing it broke decades of bipartisan consensus in foreign policy by excluding the main opposition from the process. Since then, the party has maintained a deliberately vague position, referencing international law and UN resolutions without explicitly endorsing Morocco’s proposal.

The inconsistency became glaring in July 2025 when a self-proclaimed representative of the Polisario Front attended the PP’s national congress in Spain. The move sparked outrage in Morocco and raised doubts about the party’s true intentions. Matters escalated further in February 2026, when the foreign minister accused the PP of a ‘double game’—publicly criticizing Spain’s Sahara policy while privately signaling support for Morocco’s stance to Moroccan officials.

If these allegations hold weight, the PP’s strategy could backfire spectacularly. While opposing the government’s Sahara policy from the opposition benches may be electorally advantageous, reversing course once in power would carry significant diplomatic and economic costs. The international landscape has also shifted since 2022, with the Moroccan autonomy plan gaining broader international backing and Spain embedding its Sahara position within a much larger bilateral framework.

immigration and the rise of ‘national priority’

The PP’s contradictions extend beyond the Sahara. Facing growing competition from the far-right party Vox, the PP has adopted a tougher stance on immigration and public benefits, introducing the concept of ‘national priority’ into the political debate. Originally a hallmark of far-right discourse in Europe, this idea prioritizes Spanish nationals over foreigners in access to welfare and social services.

The debate reached a peak in April 2026 when Vox pushed the concept into national legislation, prompting the PP to clarify its position. Some party members, such as Jaime de los Santos, insisted that ‘all legally residing immigrants enjoy the same rights as Spanish citizens’, while others softened the language, speaking instead of ‘residential priority’ or ‘anchoring’. Yet the damage was done: Vox had successfully nudged the PP toward adopting part of its agenda, blurring the lines between mainstream conservatism and far-right rhetoric.

the feijóo paradox: opposition vs. governance

The PP’s core challenge is a paradox: as an opposition party, it can afford to take a hardline stance against Morocco to score political points. But if it wins the election, it will inherit a deeply entrenched bilateral relationship that no Spanish government can afford to dismantle. Cooperation with Morocco is not merely a policy choice—it is a strategic necessity dictated by geography, security imperatives, and economic interdependence, not least with the 2030 World Cup on the horizon.

The most likely scenario is not a rupture but a continuation of current policies under a different guise. The PP may find itself compelled to uphold the existing framework, leaving it to explain to its base why it has abandoned the positions it once so vehemently opposed. The foreign minister’s allegations of covert diplomacy suggest that behind closed doors, the PP may be far more pragmatic than its public rhetoric implies.

The real question is not whether the PP is ‘anti-Moroccan’, as claimed by the government. It is how far the party is willing to go in using Morocco as a political punching bag to outmaneuver the PSOE and Vox—and whether, once in power, it would have the stomach to translate that rhetoric into state policy. One thing is certain: Spain’s future government will inherit a partnership with Morocco that is more robust than ever, and no amount of political posturing can change that reality.