The Mali crisis: regional alliances, Russia’s setback, and shifting Sahel dynamics

As Mali grapples with profound instability, its regional partners appear to be looking elsewhere. Neither the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) — intended to foster a collective security response among Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger — nor ECOWAS, which Bamako has withdrawn from, seem capable of exerting significant influence. Amidst silences, perfunctory condemnations, and intricate political calculations, West Africa presents an image of strategic void. Bakary Sambe, president of the Timbuktu Institute and a research professor at Gaston-Berger University in Saint-Louis, offers insights into this period that is reshaping West African security dynamics.

Following the April 25 attacks, what is the current understanding of the situation in Mali?

Bakary Sambe: The coordinated assault was devastating, particularly in Kati, where Defense Minister Sadio Camara tragically lost his life, now succeeded by General Assimi Goïta himself. However, at this juncture, it’s crucial to avoid premature conclusions about a potential regime change or the fall of Bamako. Life continues as best it can, and Malians, accustomed to crises, once again demonstrate their remarkable resilience. This persists despite the ongoing communication war between military authorities, the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), and JNIM.

What concrete actions are Burkina Faso and Niger, Mali’s allies in the AES, taking?

Captain Ibrahim Traoré of Burkina Faso officially denounced a “monstrous conspiracy.” While some might perceive this reaction as subdued, Ouagadougou’s stance is primarily rooted in realism. Burkina Faso remains deeply preoccupied with its own internal security challenges, leading to a more reserved external engagement. Just last week, numerous soldiers lost their lives in attacks on Burkinabè soil. During the fuel blockade in Mali in late 2025, Burkina Faso had extended logistical support before its own domestic front became too complex to manage.

Legally, Articles 5 and 6 of the Liptako-Gourma Charter, which solidifies the alliance among these three Sahelian nations, are often likened to NATO’s principle of mutual assistance. This framework is quite explicit. However, for both Burkina Faso and Niger, the severe internal security threats restrict their ability to fully implement these provisions. On paper, the AES is a confederation that has not yet achieved strategic maturity, particularly regarding its capacity to pool resources and forces. This week, Niger’s authorities felt compelled to declare a national day of “fasting” and prayers against terrorism.

The Malian crisis highlights the limitations of regional alliances.

ECOWAS has called for “regional mobilization,” but what is its objective, especially since Bamako left the organization in January 2025?

This declaration must be understood within the recent regional context. It followed a significant meeting dedicated to the Sahel, held in Lomé, Togo. For the first time in years, ministers from AES member states, alongside representatives from ECOWAS, the African Union, France, the European Union, and Russia, were all present at the same table.

Beyond the immediate crisis in Mali, diplomatic efforts are underway to counteract the trend of regional fragmentation and the worsening security situation of recent years. In this context, ECOWAS aims for an image shift, distancing itself from the regional body that once considered military intervention in Niger.

During the Lomé meeting, Mali’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Abdoulaye Diop, affirmed that doors remain open for dialogue and exchange, strictly within the framework of respecting the sovereignty of Sahelian states. Through these overtures, ECOWAS intends to gradually re-engage in the Sahelian geopolitical landscape.

The African Union, however, emphasizes the importance of “continental mechanisms” to prevent increased security destabilization in the Central Sahel. What is the continental organization referring to?

Once again, the formation of the AES, with its Liptako-Gourma Charter, has somewhat disrupted the existing regional security architecture. This architecture, however, had never been particularly effective in the fight against terrorism. The reason is simple: for over a decade, regional organizations were largely sidelined from security matters, with a clear prioritization of the G5 Sahel, which was disbanded in 2023.

Despite their historical distance from Sahelian security operations, the African Union and ECOWAS continue to pursue the ideal of an intervention force, or at least a joint force. Yet, this ambition struggles to materialize on the ground. By the end of 2026, ECOWAS plans to deploy a 1,650-strong anti-terrorism brigade, but a broader armed or peacekeeping mission remains highly uncertain for now.

Nevertheless, there’s a growing realization that attempting to isolate the Central Sahel from West Africa in the fight against armed groups is a strategic error. Amidst divisive issues, security must be managed collaboratively, involving intelligence sharing and the pooling of resources. The shock of April 25 has brought the indispensable need for security cooperation, even minimal, back to the forefront.

Russia is facing a strategic defeat.

Speaking of external actors, Washington has increased its visits to the Sahel in recent months. What stance might the United States adopt regarding the Malian crisis?

Beyond Donald Trump’s relative disinterest in Africa, we observe a renewed focus from American diplomacy, with high-ranking officials returning to the Sahel, even to Niger, where US military personnel had been expelled. This is simply because the stakes have evolved.

Furthermore, the situation in Mali exposes a complete strategic defeat for Russia. The most striking evidence of this is the death of Defense Minister Sadio Camara, who was widely considered the most Russophile among the Malian military leaders who ascended to power. The departure of Africa Corps paramilitaries from Kidal serves as another powerful indicator.

Russia’s failure in the Sahel is not merely military; it is profoundly symbolic. A myth has crumbled: that of Russia’s capacity to guarantee the protection and security of regimes. Moscow’s diplomatic and security credibility risks taking a severe blow.

Conversely, if the United States believes it can challenge, or even displace, Russia from the Sahel, I think Washington will find compelling geostrategic and diplomatic arguments to establish a more significant presence in the region, particularly in Mali, with the underlying issue of resources at play.

Does the Malian crisis now threaten the countries of the Gulf of Guinea?

For coastal nations, it is primarily the dynamics within Burkina Faso that concern the central governments of Togo, Benin, Ghana, or Côte d’Ivoire. As it stands, if the Malian security situation were to deteriorate further, the repercussions would be felt more acutely in Senegal or Mauritania. Therefore, all eyes are on Ouagadougou. The fear of a Sahelian domino effect is highly relevant, as is the questioning of the AES’s future and institutional viability. Populations are awaiting concrete solutions beyond mere rhetoric.

Meanwhile, Togo endeavors to forge a new “bridge with the Sahel,” to quote Togolese Foreign Affairs Minister Robert Dussey. Time will tell what this ambition truly entails.

The Sahel cannot be separated from West Africa.

Should we fear a domino effect after these attacks, particularly in Burkina Faso?

The Malian case is unique; to assume such an attack would replicate elsewhere would be to jump to conclusions too quickly. Crucially, the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) does not operate in Burkina Faso. In Mali, the catalyst was the confluence of deep security crises in the North and political turmoil in Bamako.

Paradoxically, the severity of these attacks could generate a form of political capital for the authorities in power. This is because whenever the issue of the North becomes critical or overtly apparent, it unifies the Malian population around its army, driven by a sense of territorial integrity. Rallying around the flag has never been stronger in Bamako in recent days, to the extent that it chills the ardor of any dissenting voice, which, in the current climate, would be perceived as contrary to the prevailing patriotism. The authorities no longer even require galvanizing communication.

To revisit the domino effect, despite vast territories outside Ouagadougou’s central government control, there is, for now, no influential protest movement capable of bolstering JNIM jihadists and destabilizing Burkina Faso to such an extent.