Beyond borders: how JNIM is seizing state functions in Mourdiah and Nara

On June 24, 2026, vehicles began moving once again along the vital corridor connecting Bamako to Mourdiah and Nara in west-central Mali. This followed a grueling weeks-long blockade orchestrated by JNIM (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin). However, the most striking aspect of this reopening was not the resumption of traffic itself, but the process that facilitated it. My observations indicate that this breakthrough was not the result of a decisive military strike by the state, but rather the fruit of intense mediation by local dignitaries and community leaders who engaged directly with the insurgent group.

This event forces us to re-evaluate our understanding of conflict in the Sahel. It suggests that the war is no longer just a series of military advances and retreats. Instead, the struggle is increasingly defined by the ability to control movement, dictate the flow of goods, and influence the basic rhythms of daily life. I believe the center of gravity has shifted: the core question is no longer just who occupies a piece of land, but who actually performs the functions that allow a society to exist. This evolution marks a strategic pivot for JNIM toward a broader production of authority.

The transition from territorial conquest to functional dominance

What we are witnessing in the Sahel today is a fundamental change in the objective of warfare. The competition is moving away from permanent territorial occupation toward the control of essential societal functions. This shift requires us to look past geography and focus on the flows—the movement of people, the regulation of markets, and the production of order.

Recent patterns across Mali since 2024 confirm this trend. While JNIM continues to target military forces, it has integrated road blockades and supply restrictions into its core strategy. By pressuring corridors between Bamako and hubs like Kayes, Nioro-du-Sahel, Ségou, or Mourdiah, the group exerts influence that far exceeds military reach. These tactics disrupt markets and dictate the survival conditions of entire populations.

I argue that for JNIM, controlling these functions is now as vital as controlling space. A state exists not just through sovereignty over land, but through its perceived utility: securing travel, resolving disputes, and managing trade. When an insurgent group begins to fulfill these roles, the nature of the conflict is transformed. This is what I call the functional capture of the state—a strategy where the armed actor leaves the administrative costs to the government while seizing the functions that make the state relevant to the people.

When the state is no longer the sole source of authority

The role of local communities in lifting the Mourdiah blockade is telling. Their involvement does not necessarily signal political support for JNIM; rather, it reflects a pragmatic survival instinct. For traders, transporters, and traditional leaders, negotiation is a necessity when the state cannot guarantee the continuity of exchange. This creates a complex landscape where various forms of legitimacy—legal, traditional, and insurgent—clash and coexist.

While the modern state relies on legal-rational authority, JNIM is attempting to build what I describe as performative legitimacy. This isn’t based on institutional status, but on the repeated demonstration of capacity. By settling local disputes quickly, regulating markets, or deciding when a road opens, they provide a concrete, albeit coercive, order. In the peripheries of Mali, where state presence is often intermittent, JNIM is not just contesting the monopoly on violence; it is contesting the monopoly on social organization.

The group appears to be seeking a gradual functional divestment of the state. By embedding themselves in the daily lives of the population—securing movement and resource access—they shift the political center of gravity. The state may remain the legal sovereign, but it risks losing its practical legitimacy if it cannot provide the predictable order that citizens require for their daily existence.

Conclusion: The battle for social recognition

Ultimately, the challenge facing Sahelian nations is not merely a military one. Every successful local mediation or reopened road outside of state channels shifts the boundaries of political legitimacy. The decisive battle currently unfolding is a competition between two entities claiming to be the most credible organizer of collective life. To prevail, the state must once again become the most reliable actor in providing justice, security, and mobility. The conflict is less about who holds the guns and more about who is recognized as the true producer of authority.